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424 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
THX WAY OF THn TRANSGREssoR is EASY, if he is shrewd enough to take
an immunity bath, or avail himself of any of a -dozen other provisions of
the law made with good intentions and left lying about loose enough to be
misappropriated. One rule that has served him many a good turn, is that
there is no contribution between tort-feasors. Another way of stating it is
that. the courts are not open to help rogues out of the predicaments into
which their dishonest dealings placed them, and the counterpart of the doc-
trine in equity is that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
So far therefore as civil liability is concerned, all that is necessary to pro-
tect the knave is to get his dupe to join in the knavery. This successfully
done he may fleece his victim with impunity. This doctrine has even been
applied to criminal liability, under the notion that the prosecution is in Eome
way for the redress of the person injured (McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 47o;
State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271), theerby extending the -immunity to both civil
and criminal liability; but at this, most of the courts have balked, saying
that if both are guilty, that is no reason why each should not be punished,
and pointing out that the doctrine is inapplicable, because,. in the criminal
suit, the state is seeking relief and is no party to the knavery. Criminals
have never been allowed to escape by merely showing that others are guilty
and have not been punished (Com. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571; In re Cummins,
16 Colo. 451, 27 Pac. 887, L. R. A. 752, 25 Am. St. Rep. 291). In this con-
nection the thing desired by the professional criminal is something that will
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afford 'him ample protection against criminal prosecution; for he has suffi-
cient civil protection in the doctrine above mentioned.
This desired protection from criminal liability was found for a while in
the notion, declared by Chief Justice HoLT, that we are not to indict a man
for making a fool of another, and therefore it is not an offense to be pun-
ished criminally to get the better of a man by means 'of a trick against which
common prudence is a sufficient guard, as by lying to -him, which the court
considered to be only a common cheat to be redressed by a civil action. All
that is necessary to make the immunity by this doctrine complete, is to play
upon the cupidity of the victim, and make him think he is -doing the cheat-
ing himself, whereby he will be barred from civil redress. By such means
professional knavery soon became an established legitimate business; and it
was also discovered that prudence was nqt such a cheap and common article
as had been supposed. What 'was supposed to be sufficiently guarded against
by common prudence was found frequently to catch both wise and other-
wise. The result was the statute making it criminal to obtain money, goods,
wares, or merchandise by false pertenses. In the interpretation of these
statutes the courts again fell into the error of holding .that the statute was
not violated by a pretense so transparent that anyone of ordinary understand-
ing would not be fooled by it, such as by the offer of the green-goods man
to give $iooo of -good money for $ioo, or a thousand other games that are
worked successfully on a large portion of the public, and not aLways con-
fined to the simple-minded; and the courts also made the mistake of holding
that the pretense referred to in the statute must be one relating to present or
past alleged fact, and not matter of future promise, or matter of opinion.
With the law thus interpreted, -it would seem that the door for the escape
of the professional sharper still stands wide open. All 'he need do is to con-
fine his operations to that simpler part of the community which most needs
the protection of -the lav, which is nevertheless plenty large enough to pay
well for -the work, and he may ply his trade -without fear of punishment.
The viciousness of such a doctrine is so manifest that most of the courts
have now come to -the conchion that it matters not how manifest the fraud
may be if it really did deceive the victim.
But even with this defense eliminatqd, the professionil crook still has a
legitimate field of operations where -he is liable neither civilly nor criminally;
and that is the operation of a cheat which is accomplished by means of false
promises, in which -the victim is induced to believe that 'he is to obtain some
illegal advantage, and arts for -that purpose. It is a disgrace to the law that
it is so, -but it still remains the fact. A recent case will illustrate the way
the trick can be and is being worked. One Foster told prosecutor that if she
would give him $11o and accompany him to a place out of the state, he would
there procure for her $1,ooo in counterfeit money. The bad money was not
to be given at once on receipt of the good money, but credit was to be given
the crook to get it. The pretense was one of promise only; the prosecutor
was induced to believe she would gain an illegal advantage, which shut -the
doors of the courts against her in seeking civil redress. The pretense was
merely promissory, and so not within the statute. Here then is a legitimate
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and honorable business, which may be conducted in the open without fear
of liability either civilly or criminally. So holds the Court of Appeals of
Georgia. Foster v. State, 68 S. E. 739.
The disgrace of our criminal law is the network of technicalities which
enable the manifest criminal to escape liability, and the delay with which the
result is reached even when the guilty party does not escape; and these delays
and uncertainties combine -to deprive our criminal code of its proper re-
straining influence of the criminal, or protection to the public.
As a final word, applicable to the precise case above put, it is interesting
to note that a possible hope of conviction is held out by such decisiohns as
Crum v. State, 148 Ind. 47 N. E. 833, obtaining money by such a fraud is
common law larceny; which is disregarding the rule that if the fraud in-
duces the owner to part with possession only and the taker converts it, the
offense is larceny, but if by means of the fraud the crook induces the owner
to part with both possession and title to him it is obtaining by false pretenses.
J. R. R.
